Post-Communism: the Emergence of the Post-National Intellectual

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Abstract

This study offers an outline of the differences in scope for the term in Eastern and Western Europe. After comparing the different roles assigned to intellectuals in France and East-Central Europe (later to be referred to as ‘the Soviet Bloc’), the study identifies specialisation as specific to Western intellectuals, while difficult and sometimes undesirable under communism. This (lack of) specialisation has a definite impact on the kind of reception East-Central European intellectuals had at home (where they were expected to offer their input under the guise of ‘fiction’) and in the West. It stresses the importance of a contemporaneous phenomenon: the emergence of a new type of intellectual who goes beyond the national confines of his / her culture, towards a more effective, international status.

Keywords: intellectual, East European culture, dissidence, specialisation

The intellectual history of our century might almost be written as a study of what has been achieved by all the imaginative writers, philosophers, social theorists, and scholars violently uprooted from their homelands in Eastern and Central Europe and transplanted, as a rich and exotic new stock, in the West.

(Robert Alter, “Milosz: Poetry and Politics”)

Dissidence and exile are two recurrent themes throughout the 20th century. Given the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regimes, dissidence was almost a modus vivendi for honest intellectuals there. We can say that they were actually forced into this position by the inflexibility of a political system which denied them their role as independent intellectuals – “that social category which performs the task of making conscious and visible the fundamental notions of a society.” Since the communist party was the sole entity allowed to express the ‘official’ (and only the official) ideology, the only solution left for those who did not want to conform to this ideology (and who wanted to express their dissent) was exile.

Chronologically, the figure of the East-Central European intellectual in the second half of the 20th century evolved from the ‘engineer of souls’ of the early years, while the Communist Party was still trying to attract intellectuals and use their works to its advantage, to the dissident of the later years, who was constantly under suspicion from

the party and was overwhelmed by an ever-increasing feeling of helplessness. In Western democracies, on the other hand, the role of assessing and adjusting the system was already assigned to the proper democratic agencies represented, among others, by highly specialised intellectuals. Dissidents from the Soviet Bloc were considered useful allies by Western governments in the ideological cold war, but their role as intellectuals was seen as much more limited than it had appeared to their audiences back home.

In the new millennium, technological developments and advancements in the field of human rights led to a much freer circulation of people and, even more so, of ideas. In this new, cosmopolitan world, it is extremely necessary, both at an individual level and on a more theoretical, structured level, to bridge cultural divides, and the works of East-Central European authors exiled in the West do precisely that: bridge differences between East-Central Europe, on the one hand, and Western Europe and North America on the other. In doing so, they contribute to the emergence of a new type of intellectual who goes beyond the national confines of his / her culture, towards a more effective, international status.

The Role of the Intellectual

Most scholars focus on the end of the 19th century as the moment when the concept of ‘intellectual’ came to be used consistently (although the social involvement of the Encyclopaedists made them the first modern intellectuals). From the very beginning, a clear split emerges between the term ‘intelligentsia’, as used in Russia and Eastern Europe beginning with the 19th century2 and the term ‘intellectual’ as first used in France during the Dreyfus affair.

In France, the Dreyfus affair triggered both (self)definitions on the part of intellectuals and violent accusations against this newly identified category. In this ideological war, intellectuals were accused of being voices without a mandate, of embodying the death of instinct, in a reaction against tradition and towards intellectual cosmopolitanism. They were also accused of seeing themselves as the new spiritual guides for humanity, or of being the enemies of the national ‘soul.’ From this point on, as Victor Brombert has noticed, “the French concept of the intellectual […] remains bound up with the notion of a social, political and moral crisis. Better still, it implies the notion of a permanent state of crisis. Given this sense of crisis, the intellectual considers it his obligation to intervene”3, to be socially involved, and this distinguishes the French intellectual from other intellectuals in the Western world. On the other hand, an autonomous literary field was created in 19th century France, in parallel with the intellectual field, a separation that does not characterise East-Central Europe.

The distinction between ‘intellectuals’ and ‘intelligentsia’ was also acknowledged once the Soviet Bloc came into being, with intelligentsia defined, along Marxist lines, as not quite a social class of its own, but a stratum that “is supposed to be characteristic of societies in which the transformation of the pre-capitalistic social structure took place before the formation of a numerous and strong bourgeoisie (middle class) in a way

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different from what has happened in Western Europe.”

That is, when a still-unformed bourgeoisie could not take the lead in the creation of a national state, the intelligentsia took up that role, by first endeavouring to create a national culture similar to that of their role models: England, France, or Spain. The image of the intellectual and even, more specifically, of the writer in East-Central Europe is that of a founding figure for a culture and a nation – which is not the case in Western Europe, where the nation state is much older, as “the stage of new national ethnogenesis occurred in the Middle Ages, in the period before the awakening of nations, before the origin of nationally oriented intelligentsias and before the cultural revival of the masses.”

During the first half of the 19th century, many European universities opened departments of modern literatures, and this meant that “the formal study of literature was to provide the histories and textbooks for teaching the modern languages and literatures in schools: the institutionalization of literary studies became part of unwritten but powerful national agendas […] Literature and literary scholarship acquired a political justification and social as well as academic prestige by becoming the keeper of the national soul.” This institutionalization of literature was more strongly implemented in multinational societies (characteristic of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), “societies that had problematic identities […] Constructing a national literature was in these areas a major contribution to the struggle for a national language, culture, and political independence. Vernacular literature was often a prelude to state formation and even a precondition for it.” Sometimes, in East-Central Europe “competing national projects” emerged, and the concept of national literature evolved from everything written in any language within the country’s borders to everything written in the national language (the national language being an intrinsic prerequisite to a national spirit and a national state).

According to Ernest Gellner, nationalism “invents nations where they do not exist.” In East-Central Europe, this invention also involved creating national literatures, a revival of national languages which was often furthered by new journals (something which could be rather divisive), usually based on French or Italian literary models, but the theoretical structures employed were most of the time German, following Herder’s works and the German romantic drive to build a national spirit. The whole “creation of a national culture” through the establishment of a national literature and a national language has been seen as a fundamental component in the creation of the Western nation-state. The dynastic states in 19th century East-Central Europe, on the other hand, did not coincide with the national contours, and this fact “effectively eliminated the possibility that the existing monarchies [unlike the British or French empires] would ever combine political rule with cultural ascendancy.” This left national cultures at the disposal of the intelligentsia, and that is why, in East-Central European countries, starting with the 19th century, the role of the writer was much more

5 Oskar Krejci, Geopolitics of the Central European Region. The View from Prague and Bratislava (Bratislava: VEDA Publishing House of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2005), 263.
7 As quoted by Marcel Cornis-Pope and John Neubauer, 16.
important than that of their counterparts in the West. At that time, most of these countries were trying to create national states for themselves, a process in which literature, “far from being a reflection of reality, was very frequently a creator of new identities and new social and political realities.”

What Cornis-Pope calls “the national literature projects” was thus part of the political battle fought by these future states, and this meant a much more prestigious position for writers. This also explains why, initially, the revolutionary intelligentsia did not seek the autonomy of intellectual work from politics - engaged literature was their raison d’être. That’s the reason why between 1945-1989 “the Communist Party, for all its opposite intent, preserved the power of the word and the moral and political position of intellectuals at a time when in Western Europe and America intellectuals were no longer taken very seriously as political commentators.” But the imposition of social realism as the only form of accepted literature deprived intellectuals of this role, since it “forbids what has in any age been the writer’s essential task - to look at the world from his own independent viewpoint, to tell the truth as he sees it, and so to keep watch and ward in the interest of society as a whole.”

The movement towards the emancipation of literature from social realism and propagandistic tasks was marked, in the Soviet Bloc, by the third Congress of Soviet Writers in May 1959. The moment also indicated that writers were “no longer regarded as being so important as they believed”, their role now was only to assist the party in the education of the ‘new man.’ From this moment on, the prevailing model of organisation for intellectuals interested in having a contribution to the ideological and political shaping of the country was that of independent groups, such as “the Petöfi group that played a major part in the Hungarian revolution in 1956, Charta 77 that united Czechoslovakian intellectuals opposed to their country’s occupation by the troops of the Warsaw Pact in 1968, or KOR – the group of intellectual counsellors of Solidarność, the Polish movement that defied communism in the 1980’s.”

In contrast with the two instances of France and East-Central Europe (with its Soviet development), the cultural and political context in Great Britain and the United States has been often seen as quite the opposite - “uniquely unintellectual - not to say downright anti-intellectual”, in that both Great Britain and the United States excluded the intellectuals from any significant role in the formation of a unified culture (a special note is usually made for Irish intellectuals, which might suggest that there is actually a direct relation between national movements and the status of the intellectual). Russell Jacoby’s more nuanced approach sees “a generational move from public intellectuals earlier in the century to university thinkers at its end. Intellectuals have not disappeared,

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13 Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu, *Intelectualii în cimpul puterii. Morfologii și traiectorii sociale [Intellectuals in the field of power. Social morphologies and trajectories]* (Iași: Polirom, 2007), 339. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from Romanian in this study are mine.
but something has altered in their composition. They have become more professional and insular; at the same time they have lost command of the vernacular, which thinkers from Galileo to Freud had mastered.15 Intellectuals appear to have lost their independence and breadth of thought, something Richard Posner accounts for with a pragmatic, market–oriented approach. Posner points to “an absence of the quality controls [for the ‘public intellectual] that one finds in other markets for goods and services, including the market for academic scholarship.”16 A similar study of the British scene uses a more traditional, historical approach, only to conclude that “the modern concept of the intellectual represents, in part, an attempt to counter the limiting effects of specialization while drawing on the authority which the process confers.”17

The general agreement seems to be that academia has somehow swallowed the (previously independent) intellectual into a safe world of highly specialised intellectual pursuits, and in doing so has effectively cut him (or her) off from the general public whose opinion it was his / her duty to (in)form.

None of these studies, however, pays much attention to what is supposed to be the goal of the work of public intellectuals - to inform and direct civil society - a task that has been paramount for East–Central European intellectuals over the last decades. As citizens’ civil rights were very limited under the communist regimes and at the discretion of the Party, the main activity of intellectuals in the area was dedicated to informing citizens of their civil rights and helping gather groups of individuals determined enough to claim them. In view of the way in which civil society in Great Britain and the United States adjusted to the waves of black movements, feminist movements, GLBT movements, and other minority and human rights movements, the work of the British or American ‘unknown intellectual’ definitely deserves its ode.

**Specialisation**

From the different historical roles intellectuals played in Western and Eastern Europe, we can see that the most obvious current distinction is then at the level of specialisation. Historically, in Western culture with a Greek and Latin tradition, the intellectual would normally cover more than one of what we now call human sciences: philosophy, political sciences, literature etc. (One has just to consider the founding fathers, Plato and Aristotle.) This was true for a long time: we still use the phrase ‘a Renaissance man’ to name somebody skilled in several of our (quite recent) divisions of culture. With the ‘social division of labour’ and probably with the values of modernity, more and more emphasis was laid on specialisation. Faced with the remarkable successes of the natural sciences, humanities began adopting their methodology and systems, together with a high regard for specialisation: intellectuals were forced into ready-made categories - philosophy, sociology, psychology, political science, literature... where literature (in prose) acquired the new and more specific name of fiction - to further differentiate it from the other branches concerned with depicting and analysing ‘reality.’

In communist states, philosophical thinking was limited to Marxism, political thinking (for all the claims made by the propaganda) was made redundant by the existence of the all-knowing single Party, and relevant social sciences were banned for fear that the results of their studies would provide evidence against the official theories. In Romania in the 1980s the sociology departments were actually closed down and their students transferred to the - Marxist - philosophy departments. Basically, “the Party had assumed the sole right of initiative in the very same areas of social life that were originally the exclusive, very nigh definitional domain of the intelligentsia.”\(^\text{18}\) Independent thinkers in the field of humanities could not publish anything that would have gone against the party line. This was sometimes true even in the sciences – innovations coming from the West were received with suspicion and scientists who tried to adopt them in their work risked being accused of cosmopolitanism. As Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu notes, this situation developed into a “specifically Soviet opposition between the Marxist-Leninist theory (elevated to the rank of scientific ideology) and the applied sciences; between theoreticians (generalists) and specialists.”\(^\text{19}\)

Under these circumstances, the only place left for intellectual opposition was in literature or art. Philosophical journalism and aesthetics offered more ways of avoiding censorship than did the scientific branches of intellectual activity, and also posed greater difficulties to the orthodox dogma of the regime. As Milosz once noted, “the most neuralgic points of the doctrine are philosophy, literature, the history of art, and literary criticism. Those are the points where man in his unfortunate complexities enters the equation.”\(^\text{20}\) Consequently, the only form of expression left for an honest intellectual (wanting to be published) was fiction - be it in the form of literature, film, or theatre - in which the truth could be clad in a metaphorical dress to get it past censorship. In this regard, there is an obvious irony in the fact that the road opened by ‘socialist realism’ ended with a highly metaphorical or allegorical art form. Basically, literature could benefit from the intrinsic ambiguity of the fictional discourse. And here the terminology as used in the West and in the communist countries begins to diverge. The already larger-than-life figure of the literary writer in a communist country had to fill in for all the other roles which had been banned by the state: it was his / her duty to the readers who were starved for truth – that is, an image of reality that corresponded to their own lived experience.

This role is by no means confined to the Eastern European states. As Edward Said noted, “in dark times, an intellectual is very often looked to by members of his or her nationality to represent, speak out for and testify to the sufferings of that nationality”\(^\text{21}\) (an observation born out quite remarkably by the recent events in the Middle East, where intellectuals were again called to take a stand against political oppression). Censorship is proof that the state also saw literature as a true image of reality, clashing with the official one. On the other hand, this view of literature as a political tool did not conform to the Western idea of literature, demoting it to ‘propaganda’ or political writing at best, with a view of politics as degrading the lofty ideals of literature.

\(^{18}\) Bauman, 178.
\(^{19}\) Gheorghiu, 83.
The actual competency of intellectuals to fulfil those manifold roles in communist countries was put to the test after the fall of communism, when many intellectuals were called to play an active role in the political arena. Vaclav Havel is just one - maybe the most successful - of many examples, and it is noteworthy that Timothy Garton Ash described him in 1986 as “a playwright catapulted by circumstances and the dictates of conscience into the role of ‘dissident,’ but not at all by temperament a political activist.” The election of many East-Central European intellectuals in the newly established parliaments was justified by the general expectation that they were capable of understanding and using the ‘new’ democratic concepts and values introduced from the West. The fact that most of them subsequently retired from politics (usually disgusted and regretting the waste of time and effort which - many said - might have been put to better use in the writing of their ‘literary’ creations) also indicates the rise in the post-communist period of a new type of intellectual, more systematically focused on just one of the specialised fields of politics, sociology, philosophy, literature, etc.

The movement of East-Central European exiled authors from the communist literary arena, where their output meant so much to so many people into a free world where they had to struggle to make their voices heard and their books read (and sometimes even to prevent themselves from being hijacked into unwanted political stands) produced a new type of intellectual, one who had to find the means to address a wider and much more diverse audience.

The Role of the Post-National Intellectual

The relationship between the communist authorities and intellectuals changed over the years. The authors who were active before and during World Word II, who had acquired some fame and the respect of their readers were initially courted by the authorities, who tried to convince them to present ‘their side of the story.’ Those who did not comply were not published. The option was between not writing or publishing at all and writing or publishing according to the socialist realist code. The regimentation of authors was accomplished through the Writers’ Union, an organization that, at the same time, helped the Party control the intellectuals and offered them some privileges in order to better motivate them into being instrumental in the transmission of the official ideology to their readers. The procedure for entering the union clearly illustrates the double allegiance of its members: applicants had to produce a character reference from some collective official body (the Party organization, Union or youth group) vouching for their political and moral conformity, and a letter of recommendation from two members of the union confirming their literary skills.

Over the years, both parties became better skilled at the censorship game: the censors learned to identify the potentially ‘inflammatory’ aspects of a literary text and the authors learned how to disguise their ideas, making them acceptable to the censors, while still meaningful to their readers. This situation actually created a very strong and special relationship between authors and their readers: the author offered an alternate view of reality to the official / propaganda one, in what was almost like second-hand

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23 Gheorghiu, 263.
therapy – the truth you cannot utter is stated by another. From a marketing point of view, the situation made no sense: the books which would have been bestsellers were the most difficult to get published. This fact was acknowledged by the sales-people who, in Romania, would offer packages: the best-selling book by an almost dissident author (open dissidence meant he could not publish) together with some party policy book that no one wanted to read – like selling the poison with its antidote.

This created a very special relationship between the author and his readers, a bond which could only be broken by very strong pressure, but censorship gradually made it impossible for writers to communicate, even in an oblique way with their readers of choice. The writers’ struggle against censorship was also complicated by the shift in the official code after Stalin’s death and the public admission by communist officials of the ‘errors’ of the Stalinist period. The third Congress of Soviet Writers in May 1959 brought with it a little more freedom for writers, “a certain abdication by the party of its exclusive prerogatives in the control of literature, in favour of the corporate judgement of the writers themselves.”24 The party line became blurry again and, for a while, authors were allowed to reveal at least part of the truth. Also, at the time, the only way for an East-Central European writer to gain international recognition was a clear break, in the form of dissidence or exile, from what Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu calls “the total institution represented by socialist literature.”25 Unfortunately, the nationalistic tendencies that became manifest in the region after the Stalinist period and became stronger after the fall of communism ended up by imposing another fixed image of ‘reality,’ which again made it impossible for intellectuals to express their views fully. The writer was now a double exile, from his own country and from his community in exile.

On the other side of the Iron Curtain, East-Central European exiled authors were paradoxically faced with a different type of opposition. After trying to get away from a prescribed way of viewing their world, they discovered that they were being accused by some intellectuals in the West of practising a different kind of propaganda / anti-propaganda, which was, in the end another facet of the same kind of perversion exercised on the free spirit. Hannah Arendt, for example, noted in 1953 that

All studies of the Soviet systems, even when prepared by the most reliable experts, suffer from a decisive lack of source material [...] This lack of undisputed documentary evidence has led many scholars to accept Russian government sources and to succumb to Bolshevik propaganda simply because it appears to them to be more reputable than the records of personal experience by victims of the regime or the spectacular confessions of former officials.26

When representative literary figures of East-Central European managed, at the same time, to capture the interest of a large Western audience, they became a kind of cultural interpreters between the two worlds.

In an article published right after the dramatic events of 1989, British-American historian Tony Judt offers a timeline for the evolution of the relationship of Western intellectuals with East-Central Europe. In the post-Stalinist era, he notes:

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24 Hayward, 107.
25 Gheorghiu, 311.
with the diminished credibility of the Soviet utopia (notably as a by-product of Khruschev's revelations at the Twentieth Congress), the intelligentsia of the Left in the West turned away from the region altogether and began instead to project their hopes onto the non-European world. As a consequence, with attention centered on Algeria, Ghana, Cuba, and (eventually) the Far East, the Soviet satellites closer to home became an embarrassing irrelevance – irrelevant because for all but the most hard-bitten of Communists they no longer served as prototypes of postrevolutionary societies, embarrassing because they offered disconcertingly proximate reminders of the achievements of real socialism in its European homelands.27

The events of the last decades of communism in East-Central Europe dramatically discredited the tenability of communist ideology, with direct results on the attitude of Western intellectuals towards the area: as reality kept sabotaging the ideological construct, the theoretical means available to Western intellectuals for analysing its complexities (either from a political or sociological point of view) proved unequal to the task of bridging the cultural divide.

But the individual instances of dissidents from the Soviet Bloc have created, over the second half of the 20th century, a new image of a post-national intellectual who takes responsibility for the impact of ideas on real life. Their ideas created a geographical entity for East-Central Europe which is close to Western Europe and specifically distinct from Russia, a fact that is born out in the configuration of the European Union today. Their insistence on the importance of historical events in the collective memory of any nation led to the opening, in East-Central Europe, over the last two decades, of several Holocaust museums and museums of Communism (a project for a Romanian museum of Communism has just been announced). Perhaps their most important stand regards, indeed, Communism: against the trend that saw Communism as a good idea applied badly, they showed that an idea which can only be applied badly is, in logical consequence, a bad idea. Their experience with censorship at home reinforced the fact that freedom of speech is a most important mechanism for the self-regulation of any society. Their position in Western society, on the other hand, allowed them to inform the rest of the world on the realities of East-Central Europe in the second half of the 20th century, against the official propaganda of the communist regime. The fact that they used their native language placed their work in the category of national literatures which were not well-known until then, and which they brought to the attention of a wider public. Thus, they were instrumental in changing this status to that of ‘emerging literatures,’ a position that benefits other recently discovered national literatures which are no longer valued just for their exoticism. On the contrary, the importance of a post-national approach for the free circulation of ideas in the new millennium is becoming apparent.

References

Postcomunismul: apariția intelectualului post-național

Studiul de față trasează diferențele dintre Europa de Vest și cea de Est în privința sferei pe care o acoperă termenul „intellectual”. După ce compară rolurile diferite atribuite intelectualilor în Franța față de Europa Centrală și de Est (numite pe parcursul lucrării „Blocul Sovietic”), articolul identifică prezența specializării ca o caracteristică a intelectualilor vestici, trăsătură ce a fost însă dificil de atins în comunism, fiind uneori chiar indezirabilă. Această absență a specializării a avut un impact cert asupra receptării intelectualilor est-europeni în propriile lor țări (unde contribuțiile lor se făceau sub masca „ficțiunii”), dar și în Vest. Lucrarea pune accentul pe importanța unui fenomen contemporan: apariția unui nou tip de intelectual care depășește granițele naționale ale culturii lui, avansând spre un statut mai eficient, internațional.