

Pas-de-noms/ Plus de noms. Derrida and Blanchot

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Abstract

Recalling the homograph *plus de* as the minimal definition of deconstruction, the article examines the problematic of names in several Derridian contexts referring to the doubled, divided gift of names. It focuses more specifically on Derrida's essay "Pas", dealing with Blanchot's *récit*, in which Blanchot's *pas au-delà* (step/not beyond) is analysed in conjunction with the duality of an affirmative *sans* as well as *sauf* (both save and except for), already discussed in *Sauf le Nom*, in order to strategically reinscribe Blanchot's name in literature and philosophy. After a detour via the Blanchotian argument about literature as passion in *Demeure*, the article connects Blanchot's experience of literature and death as anonymous passivity (an experience which he called the *Neutral*) to the name without name, illustrating it in a few of his *récits*.

Keywords: *Derrida, Blanchot, names, step, not beyond, literature, philosophy*

The only attempt Derrida ever made to define deconstruction, as he himself admitted in "The Time is out of Joint" (27), was in the passage from *Mémoires for Paul de Man*, where he equated it with *plus d'une langue*, i.e. "more than one language", "both more than a language and no more of a language" or the "transference between languages" (15). Recalling the phrase *plus de*, this article will take into account *plus de noms*, meaning both (*no*) *more names* and *more names*.

Naming raises questions of identity, legitimacy, matters of inheritance and signature. Naming confers an identity that punctures the individuality of the one who is named since he/she never chose his/her name. Giving a name is ontological, foundation of a human being. Giving (one) a name means also alleging or declaring that person of being something. Baptizing a person represents an initiation into a religious society, especially into the Christian Church, but also offering the one who is baptized a second gift of life, offering him/ her the grace of the Holy Spirit imparted through baptism, as distinguished from the sacrament or rite. It would seem, as Derrida pointed out in *Glas* that "[t]here is no purer present, no generosity more inaugural" (6 column B) in offering somebody the gift of name. Giving somebody a name is giving him/her nothing/ no thing, yet "such a thing appropriates itself violently, harpoons, "arraigns" [*arraisonne*] what it seems to engender, penetrates and paralyzes with one stroke [*coup*] the recipient thus consecrated" (6 column B).

What's in a Name? Derrida on Names

Derrida analysed repeatedly the problematic of names, turning every time to other facets of names, in his challenging deconstructive approaches.

“No Apocalypse Not Now” gave Derrida the possibility to speak on the name of the *nuclear war*, proving in his last missile (seventh missive) that the war is

in the name of something whose name, in this logic of total destruction, can no longer be borne, transmitted, inherited by anything living, that name in the name of which war would take place would be the name of nothing it would be pure name, the "naked name" (30-31).

Names make memory possible, since people can archive, can leave traces of their civilization and culture; the end of the world would deny the very possibility of archiving names, it would mean the end of names as well, thus the end of memory.

In “The Teaching of Nietzsche and the Politics of the Proper Name”, Derrida expressed the awareness of his given name¹, his father’s name sticking to his own identity. He affirmed the “double and divided name” (16) of his parents, one deceased, one living on, making him die the death of his father and continue living on account of his mother. Starting from Nietzsche’s section “Why I am so Wise” in *Ecce Homo*, Derrida affirmed his own origins, his history as the son of his father and of his mother:

Inasmuch as I am and follow after my father, I am the dead man and I am death, inasmuch as I am and follow after my mother, I am life that perseveres, I am the living and the living feminine, I am my father, my mother and me, and me who is my father, my mother and me, my son, and me, death and life, the dead man and the living feminine, and so on. (Derrida, 1985, 16)

As summarized in *Limited Inc.*, the reply to Searle’s critique of “Signature Event Context”, Jacques Derrida’s name was a pretext to play language games with its letters and syllables, to re-name himself *ad infinitum* with: Ja, Der, Da: “Is my name still "proper" or my signature, when in proximity to "There. J.D." (pronounced in French, approximately *Der. J.D.*), in proximity to "Wo? Da." In German, to "Her. J.D." in Danish, they begin to function as integral or fragmented entities, or as whole segments of common nouns or even of things?” (Derrida, 1988, 33). One of his famous signatures in the “Envois” section of *The Post Card, J’accepte*, displaying his mock signature of a *Jacques sept*, parodied God, as Laurent Milesi noted, “with a whole theory of "I am", whose first and family names are both made up of seven letters (rather than missives), sent in apostolic succession to recipients unknown ("all of you") on multiple postcards, and now mock-countersigning the Book of Revelation "in the name of...". (2007, 61) As Milesi suggests, “Jacques Derrida’s signatures disseminate themselves in simulacra of divine revelations of a first and last or of an "exodic" *je (ne) suis (pas) celui qui je suis*, of halves of traces occupying all the positions[...].” (2007, 64).

In *Given Time*, Derrida taught us that we cannot know gifts and therefore we cannot think of what we cannot know. The gift of name is a gift, since, in order to witness a gift situation, “it is necessary [*il faut*] that the donee not give back, amortize, reimburse, acquit himself, enter into a contract, and that he never contracted a debt.”²

¹ It is worth noticing that the real given name of Jacques Derrida was Jackie, name which he changed the moment he started to publish, as he admitted in an interview with Elizabeth Weber in *Points* that “the Jewish community in Algeria in the ‘30s sometimes chose American names, occasionally those of film stars or heroes”. The other name, Elie, was never inscribed in the Civil Record. (cf. Jacques Derrida, 1995 c, 344). For further reference, see also Still, 2004, 113-127.

² Mention should be made that when giving somebody a name, there is a contract that is signed (the birth certificate), but never by the one who was given this gift, which means that this situation cannot be included in the gift exchange that Mauss envisaged in his essay on gifts (cf. Mauss, 1990).

(13)The one who is offered a name does not "give back", he "does not count on restitution" (13).

In "Aphorism Countertime" Derrida considered that Juliet's question "What's in a Name?" denies the ability of names to tell the essential of their bearers, since her own gift of name does not allow her to love the one whom she chose. Juliet claims that she is not her name, that she can be beyond her name and survive it, yet the answer to her question is the death of the two lovers, since Romeo's name bears his father's name and it is but an enemy to Juliet's name. Advising Romeo to "doff off" his name, Juliet justifies to Romeo that by renouncing his name he renounces nothing of himself, yet Romeo is what his name is, he is both his father and his mother, his historical legacy comes with the hatred against the Capulets.

The gift of Juliet's and Romeo's names becomes *das Gift* (poison), as, even if the two lovers want to escape their names, to go beyond their names, they still call each other the name that they denounce. Even on condition they give up Montague and Capulet, "[t]he forename still hears the name of the father, it recalls the law of genealogy. Romeo *himself*, the bearer of the name is not the name, it is *Romeo*, the name which he bears." (Derrida, 1992 a, 423) Juliet and Romeo love each other and die on account of the names that stick to their identity in spite of not representing anything of themselves; their names become masks that they are forced to wear and that they are merged with (cf. Derrida, 1992, 432).

After *Margins of Philosophy*, Derrida came back to the problematic of names in his "Passions: An Oblique Offering", belonging to *On the Name*, in which he minutely analyzed the fallacy of names. The "naïve rendering or common illusion" is that when one has given his name to a certain X, he supposes that "all that returns to X", directly or indirectly, finally returns to the one who gave him the name. Yet the one who admitted being named, or being called by a certain name, can make the narcissism of the person who gave him the name "frustrated *a priori* by that from which it profits or hopes to profit." (12) Derrida took the case of the one who can live autonomously, free from the one who gave him his name in which "what returns" to the one giving his name is "the ability to disappear" in his name (13).

Yet the gift of name(s) can be corrupted, as Derrida was saying in "Pas" (Pace Not(s)), "in advance in(to) the *pas-de-nom*." (98) A name can make the person disappear, it can make him "drowned in the waters of his name, in which everything is engulfed" (98).

Derrida Signing on Blanchot: "Pas"

In his *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida*, John Caputo noted that "[d]econstruction is not in the business of defaming good names but of saving them. *Sauf le Nom*." (5) It is true that Derrida saves the name with the unnamable *différance*, which points "to the differential matrix that generates names and concepts, in which they are produced as effects" (Caputo, 1997, 8).

The thematic of *sauf* was first approached by Derrida in his “Pas” (published in French in 1976), an essay on Maurice Blanchot,³ working out the dynamics of *sauf*, *pas*, *sans*, and *viens* in Blanchot:

-What does *sauf* mean?

-It is a powerful and elusive word, more or less than a word, neither adjective nor preposition, both the one and the other, at times almost a name” (Derrida, 2010, 85).

Sauf is prepositional (save / except for), adjectival (safe), and verbal. As a verb *sauf* (to save) refers to two concrete actions:

Saving (*sauver*) the name of God by keeping it safe; sacrificing the name of God precisely in order to save it. Sacrifice everything, save or except (*sauf*) the name of God. Save everything about God (keep God safe) save (except) the name of God, lest it become an idol that blocks our way (Caputo, 1997, 43).

The double bind of apophaticism consists in both negating the name of God and negate everything except his name, as Derrida was to assert in *Sauf*:

[...] as if it was necessary both to save (*sauver*) the name and to save everything except (*fors*) the name, *save the name (sauf le nom)*, as if it was necessary to lose the name in order to save what bears the name or that towards which one is borne across the name (Derrida, 1995 a, 58).

“Pas” is not the only one text on Blanchot that Derrida signed, but possibly the most outstanding one, an essay that uses two names twice, one engulfed in the other, two common nouns (names): philosophy and literature meeting via Blanchot’s *récits*, two proper nouns (names), one signing a work on the other, Derrida signing on Blanchot.

Derrida’s provocative study on Blanchot starts from Heidegger’s and Blanchot’s texts written in dialogue form; “Pas” is a dialogue between a man and a woman whose relation we do not know. As Timothy Clark suggested, the very title of the volume into which “Pas” was included, *Parages*, “refers to a signature effect in Blanchot’s *oeuvre*, the recurrence of words comprised of the letters “pa, par, para, ra, rage, age.” (1992, 145) Meaning both the negation *not* and the noun *step*, “Pas” steps back into Blanchot’s texts, interrupting them, since Derrida thought that a text cannot have solidity or coherence unless it is interrupted by another: “no text could pretend to demonstrate or prove anything unless a certain movement of the other did not come (sic!) and make it say or let it say what here tries to say itself, or what ‘is having a go at’ itself [*s’y essaie*]” (Derrida, 2004, 32).

According to Timothy Clark, Blanchot’s way of reading was “a mode of saying “yes” to the work”; Derrida’s response to Blanchot’s text in “Pas” is an affirmation of Blanchot’s reading, “a double “yes” (“*oui, oui*”), the last words of the dialogue.” (1992, 130) Derrida’s “yes, yes” corresponds to what Blanchot named

the decisive Yes. Presence without anything being present, through this affirmation, an affirmation that has freed itself from every negation (and consequently from every

³ John Leavey put together under the name *Parages* some previous translations of “Living on” (translated by James Hulbert), “Title to be Specified” (translated by Tom Conley), “The Law of Genre” (translated by Avital Ronell) and “Pas”, published for the first time in English in 2010 in his own translation.

meaning), that has relegated and deposed the world of values, that consists not in affirming, upholding, and withstanding what is, but rather holds itself above and outside being, and sees himself assigned – between being and nothingness, and out of the infinite of the sovereignty of a being without being in the becoming without end of a death impossible to die (Blanchot, 1993, 209).

Derrida's purpose in "Pas" may have been to save the name of Blanchot, to emphasize his contribution to literature, criticism and philosophy, to save "the gift itself, which gives itself" in Blanchot's texts, but to save it without naming it, without naming the one to whom the text is addressed; the text starts from a certain *you*, a *you* that is "reaffirmed, recited" (Derrida, 2010, 86), a female *you* to whom the male interlocutor addresses simply with — *Viens* "Come" (11). This woman is "the pronoun of a nameless one" (58), an *it* which steps back beyond *she*. She protests and asks legitimately: "—Why she/ it, then, and not he/it? Why I?" (59)

Derrida writes on Blanchot with Blanchot's means; he even names his study with one of Blanchot's concepts, that of *pas*, naming both a step, trace of footprint, and the negation 'not'. Yet *pas* has also a performative effect, as Timothy Clark suggested, it means an action or movement which leads towards a result; a particular move or advance in the course of an action:

The result is a composite term whose overall movement is far more complex than either affirmation or negation. Thus *pas* is not only a concept in which are held together the double movement of approach and distancing that skews and displaces Heidegger's notions of the ontological difference and the "step back" (1992, 137).

Give it a name: *récit*. From literature to philosophy

Blanchot's *récits* can name both a literary as well as a philosophical mode. Some of Blanchot's *récits*, *L'attente l'oubli* (*Awaiting Oblivion*), partly conceived as a paper given at the *Festschrift* for Heidegger's seventieth birthday, a reworking of Heidegger's concept of *Dichtung*⁴, *Thomas l'obscur* (*Thomas the Obscure*), *L'arrêt de mort* (*Death Sentence*), *Celui qui ne m'accompagnait pas* (*The One Who Was Standing Apart from Me*) cannot be named novels, even if they have characters and could be even said to have something that might be taken for a plot (although in most cases the action does not lead us somewhere in the classical sense the plot of a novel would), and they are not philosophical works either. Blanchot's *récits* are what Sean Gaston called "affirmation without redemption", a narrative that is always undone by what cannot be named, a narrative without name (143). Somehow literature suffers a change of name with Blanchot, it is literature without literature, or rather literature suffering on the margins of philosophy.

Blanchot's *L'instant de ma mort* (*The Instant of my Death*), which could be either fiction or testimony, inspired Derrida to write a book on the passions of literature, *Demeure*, where he admitted that the name of literature, as well as literature itself remained for him "endless enigmas, as much as they remain passions" (20). Starting from the Latin root of the word "literature" (Latin *Litterātūra*, whence Spanish

⁴ For Blanchot, "writing" has displaced *Dichtung*. There are two main explanations for Blanchot's divergence from Heidegger, according to Timothy Clark: Blanchot and his friend Georges Bataille were both engaged in an interpretation of Hegel's dialectic, even if the two did not "ascribe" to his "systematised idealism", and Blanchot felt very close to the Mallarméan notions of "literary writing" (Clark, 1992, 69).

literatura, Italian *letteratura*, French *littérature*, Romanian *literatură*, Portuguese *literatura*, spreading to Germanic languages *Litteratur* in German, *literature* in English), Derrida showed how the Latin name imprints itself on literature, since:

There is no thought, no experience, no history of literature as such and under this name, no world literature, if such a thing is or remains to come, as Goethe holds somewhat casually, there is no passion of literature that must not first inherit what this Latinity assumes and thereby shows itself capable of receiving it and, as I would say in French, of suffering it, which is to accept, to receive, to capacitate, to invite, to translate into itself, to assimilate, but also to contain, to keep thus within its boundaries (Derrida, 2000, 21).

Investigating its Latin-Europeanness, Derrida finally inscribed seven passions of literature: 1. “[I]terature forced upon the land of Christian passion”, 2. “the experience of love, of amorous, courtly, knightly, novelistic, romantic passion”, 3. passion implying finitude and passivity, 4. passion meaning “liability [...] imputability, culpability, responsibility, a certain *Schuldigsein*, an originary debt of being-before-the-law”, 5. passion as “pain and suffering”, 6. passion as martyrdom and testimony, 7. passion that “implies the endurance of an indeterminate or undecidable limit” where literature has to bear because “it has no essence but only functions” (cf. Derrida, 2000, 26-28).

If we think of philosophy versus literature, we might say that between the defence of philosophy against literature (cf. Plato’s suggestion to banish the poets from the ideal state or Badiou’s allegations against Heidegger and some contemporary French thinkers, charged with the “fetishism of literature” (1999, 66)) and Heidegger’s extreme idea, “claiming that as much as the task of the poet is quasi-philosophical, the task of the philosopher is quasi-poetic” (Szafraniec, 2007, 10), as well as Richard Rorty’s conceiving philosophy as a literary genre, there is a whole history of penitences and passions that many patiently testified to. Examples are so many that they can write a book on passion as experience of love between philosophy and literature.

Derrida attempted to place philosophy in the immediate vicinity of the poetic, in short of literature:

It finds itself there, for the indecision of this limit is perhaps what most provokes it to thought. It finds itself there, it does not necessarily lose itself there as those believe, in their tranquil credulity, who believe that they know where this limit is situated and timorously keep within it, ingenuously, although without innocence, stripped of what one must call the philosophical experience: a certain questioning crossing of limits, unsureness as to the border of the philosophical field – and above all the experience of language, an experience always as poetic, or literary, as it is philosophical (1994, 48).

Heidegger, who used poetry as the raw material of a good part of his philosophical work, asked “What are Poets for?” (cf. Heidegger, 1971, 89-143) and answered the question in a threefold way: literature needs to produce autonomous unities whose elements can be gathered around one unifying theme that becomes central to all these elements; literature’s task is ultimately revelation of something that is not properly and essentially literary and literature exceeds the literary context.

The writer Blanchot acknowledged more than once Bataille’s definition of the philosopher as “someone who is afraid” (Blanchot, 1993, 49) and considered that the philosopher who would write as a poet aims at “his own destruction”, as poetry is “a question” for philosophy, affirming possession of an answer, thus tripping up philosophy whose task is to question everything” (Blanchot, 1995, 63). James Phillips

sees Blanchot's effort of exhorting "literature to wallow in the infamy of its metaphysical condemnation" (2005, 59) as a defence of both art and philosophy. For Phillips both art and philosophy entail "critique and destruction" (2005, 59), as their status is based on questioning. Blanchot perceived philosophy as being responsible for the failure of literature and vice-versa, and considered that in the point where one succeeds, the other fails. (for further reference see Phillips' demonstration on the disaster of writing compromising philosophy in 2005, 67-68). For Blanchot, literature as a form of art begins the moment it "becomes a question" (Blanchot, 1997 b, 300), from this point of view literature challenging philosophy. Yet, if the questionability of the discourse of philosophy is kept within its limits, quite on the contrary, literature goes beyond its margins and "it seeks the Outside" (cf. Khatab, 93).

Blanchot on Names

Blanchot thinks of the issue of names in *Celui qui ne m'accompagnait pas* (*The One Who Was Standing Apart from Me*). The two voices of the same character fight for giving/not giving an identity inscribed in a possible name of his otherness. "Me" and the one "standing apart from me" debate for and against being possessed of a (distinguished) name/ remaining devoid of name or fame, unknown by name, left in obscurity, remaining inglorious.

'— You would like to give me a name?'

'Yes, at this moment I would like to.' And when he did not answer: 'Wouldn't that make things easier. Don't we have to come to that?'

But he still seemed to be dwelling on his question:

'Give me a name? But why?'

'I don't know exactly: maybe to lose my own' (Quoted in Derrida, 2010, 99).

Later on, in the same *The One Who Was Standing Apart from Me*, Blanchot mentions the possibility of losing one's name as a means of protecting himself against namelessness. Another means to protect a name is also to hide it as in *The Step not Beyond*:

– "We would give them a name". – "They would have one". – "The name we would give them would not be their real name". – "All the same, able to name them". – "Able to make it known that, the day they would recognize that they were ready, there would be a name for their name" (7-8).

Blanchot's names tend up to a point towards namelessness; unlike Heidegger who perceived death as finitude, Blanchot considers death something we need to aspire to, and shows how literature and death are both experienced as anonymous passivity, an experience he calls the *Neutral*. The Neutral is connected to the name without name: "In the neuter-the name *sans* name-nothing responds, except the response that fails, that has always just missed responding and missed the response, never patient enough to "go/ beyond", without this "step/ beyond" being accomplished" (Blanchot, 1992, 118). Blanchot's formula *X without X* is not purely privative but points to a duplicity in the *pas-de* (*le pas au-delà*) which makes passivity a pre-critical notion, an arch-passivity on the side of the divide passivity/activity.

The Step Not-Beyond proposes writing in order to forget names: "We write to forget your name, wanting it, not wanting it" (Blanchot, 1992, 34-36). Forgetting is also

the ultimate purpose of the two nameless characters in *L'attente l'oubli* (*Awaiting Oblivion*). Forgetting is easier if the two characters don't have a name, therefore nothing to connect them, to create a bond between them. The female character seems to long for this general Alzheimer, for premature senility which makes her whole life anonymous, inexistent:

She gave the impression, when she spoke, of not knowing how to reestablish a bond between her words and the richness of a preexisting language. They had no history, no connection with the past of everyone else, not even any relation to her own life or to anyone else's (Blanchot, 1997 a, 10).

The two heroes give each other the possibility of waiting to forget together. The male protagonist invites the female protagonist to *come*, but this is an invitation to forget together, to lose their own selves. As Derrida put it, "The gift *come* is, gives rather, gives itself in forgetting itself beyond being: pace/not beyond being" (2010, 87).

Waiting neutralizes forgetting:

Forgetting, waiting. Waiting that assembles, disperses; forgetting that disperses, assembles. Waiting, forgetting. "Will you forget me?" – "Yes, I will." – "How will you be sure that you have forgotten me?" – "I will be sure when I remember another woman." – "But I am still the one you will remember; I need more." – "You will have more: I will be sure when I no longer remember myself" (Blanchot, 1997 a, 32).

What the character should finally aspire to is not only to forget her, but to experience absolute forgetting, to lose his memory, his speech, his power of naming. This situation reminds us of the scene in which in García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, the characters start losing their speech and their power of naming things because of the insomnia that Rebecca brings to Macondo. The disease consists in forgetting naming to the point that the villagers need to paint the names of things on the things themselves. Yet the disease worsens to the point in which they need to write not only the name (*signifiant*) of the thing, but also its meaning (*signifié*), since inhabitants of Macondo realise that in spite of retaining the word/ the name, they still do not know what to do with the name. Forgetting goes as far as they need definitions of all things and all feelings and as people keep forgetting, Pilar Ternera starts the practice of reading the past in cards, which replaces her past-time activity of reading people's future in cards.

J. is the only name of the first protagonist female character from Blanchot's *Death Sentence*. Yet the first person narrator knows her full name and it is her name uttered by him that brings her back from death:

I leaned over her, I called to her by her first name; and immediately – I can say there wasn't a second interval – a sort of breadth came out of her compressed mouth; a sigh which little by little became a light, weak cry. (20)

It is the full name of the character that is the key to the door of death, yet the reader will never know it. The name which the reader will never know is uttered only once. Nobody else (the nurse, the sister, the mother, the people around her awaiting near her death bed) utters her name and the only time it is uttered by the first person narrator, it is performed in secret. Derrida connected J.'s initial to the initial of the pronoun *Je*, and concluded that "this insistence is constantly remarked, remarkable, noticeable, especially, as in the case of every crypt, in its relationship to the law, in an

interdiction” (2010, 149). The first person narrator manages to step (to take a pace, a *pas*) over the empty space of death without falling into it, in spite of the underworld lure:

At that moment, her eyelids were still completely shut. But a second afterwards, perhaps two, they opened abruptly and they opened to reveal something terrible which I will not talk about, the most terrible look which a living being can receive, and I think that if I had shuddered at that instant, and if I had been afraid, everything would have been lost, but my tenderness was so great that I didn't even think about the strangeness of what was happening, which certainly seemed to me altogether natural because of that infinite movement which drew me towards her, and I took her in my arms, while her arms clasped me, and not only was she completely alive from that moment on, but perfectly natural, gay and almost completely recovered (Blanchot, 1988 a, 20).

The “terrible”, as Blanchot calls it in his *récit*, is the name of death that cannot be named, it is what Orpheus saw when he encountered death. In *Infinite Conversation*, Blanchot had more words to name the “terrible”: “a space of emptiness and dispersion”, the “void” and “nudity” of Eurydice’s gaze in which Orpheus saw “the horror of absence, the boundless of the night that is other” (183). Orpheus’s task as well as the first person narrator’s task is “to remain present in the proximity of another who by dying removes himself definitely” (Blanchot, 1988 b, 9) and to suffer the passions of death in order to put them in writing.

The second part of the *Death Sentence*, is the part in which the first person narrator, a nameless character himself meets another almost nameless feminine character: N(athalie) is soon stripped of her own identity and becomes N. or is a simple *she*, not far from the *she* from *Awaiting Oblivion*. N. is a translator: “she translated writings from all sorts of different languages, at least from German, English, and Russian” (Blanchot, 1988 a, 55). Therefore even having a name, there is something to create the Neutral, beyond her name: knowing more languages and translating them “was an aspect of her character which helped to mislead me about her” (Blanchot, 1988 a, 55). Finally this play on languages gives the first person narrator the possibility to do things without doing them, more precisely, to marry her without marrying her, since he does it in her language:

I offered to marry her at least twice, which proved how fictitious my words were, since I had an aversion to marriage (and little respect for it), but in her language I married her, and I not only used that language lightly but, more or less inventing it, and with the ingenuity and truth of half-awareness, I expressed in it unknown feelings which shamelessly welled up in the form of the language and fooled even me, as they could have fooled her (Blanchot, 1988 a, 62).

The first person narrator’s comment is yet a final affirmation of Blanchot on how futile words and names can be, on how more words/ names of some hidden feelings may become neither words nor names that the other person knows or understands.

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Pas-de-noms/ Plus de noms. Derrida și Blanchot

Rezumat

Recurgând la omograful *plus de* în limba franceză ca definiție minimală a deconstrucției, articolul examinează problematica numelor în câteva contexte derridiene care se referă la darul dublu al numelui, atât în sens pozitiv, cât și în sens negativ. Articolul ia apoi în discuție studiul lui Derrida „Pas”, în care conceptul lui Blanchot de *pas au-delà* (desemnând deopotrivă substantivul *pas* dar și negația *nu dincolo*) este analizat în legătură cu dualitatea afirmației *sans* (fără) și *sauf* (desemnând atât verbul *a salva*, cât și locuțiunea prepozițională *cu excepția*), deja discutate în „Sauf le Nom”, pentru a reînscris numele lui Blanchot atât în literatură, cât și în filosofie. După o acoladă prin intermediul volumului *Demeure* asupra poziției literaturii față de filosofie în accepția lui Blanchot, articolul analizează experiența care apropie literatura de moarte (pe care Blanchot a perceput-o ca pasivitate anonimă și a denumit-o *Neutralitate*) și face o incursiune în câteva dintre *récit-urile* autorului francez pentru a ilustra numele *fără* nume.